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	 	 AbstrACt
The rebellion of the Democratic Forces for the Lib-
eration of Rwanda (FDLR) is the most recent in a series of re-
bellions that aimed to fight the post-genocide Rwandan regime 
from bases in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The 
FDLR is a politico-military movement, which allegedly aims to 
initiate a national dialogue in order to change the Rwandan re-
gime and to secure the return of FDLR combatants and Rwan-
dan refugees under fair conditions, by military means.  Between 
3.000 and 4.000 FDLR troops are deployed throughout South 
Kivu, where they create pockets of insecurity. The Rwandan 
government considers the FDLR combatants as ex-FAR/Intera-
hamwe genocidal forces, which threaten the Rwandan popula-
tion, as they allegedly aim to complete the genocide. Indeed, 
an ominous “Hutu culture” is in the making in South Kivu, as 
the Hutu ethnicity plays a key function in the FDLR’s discourse, 
depicting post-genocide Rwanda as skewed in favour of Tut-
si, and as inequitable and insecure for Hutu. The genocide is 
downplayed and it is replaced by feelings of injustice and vic-
timisation of Rwandan Hutu by their ethnic “rivals,” validating 
the Rwandan government’s fears of the continuation of hate 
ideologies. Nevertheless, the FDLR is a greater threat to the 
population of South Kivu than to Rwanda. The FDLR does not 
occupy land in Rwanda but controls territory in South Kivu. In 
many parts of the province, the rebellion is very violent and 
has deeply wounded its social and demographic character. The 
scale of FDLR crimes denies the rebels their alleged “right to 
self-defence” and goes beyond the stated objectives of the re-
bellion. Over the long years in exile, and in its aim to survive 
amid a volatile region, the FDLR has lost much of its ideological 
impetus and has ultimately become a fragmented movement 
lingering in eastern Congo. IOB Discussion Paper 2006-05 • 5
		 	 résumé
La rébellion des Forces Démocratiques pour la Li-
bération du Rwanda  (FDLR) représente la plus récente d’une 
série de rébellions qui aspirait à combattre le régime rwandais 
après le génocide, à partir de bases en République Démocra-
tique du Congo (RDC). Le FDLR est un mouvement politico-
militaire qui affirme vouloir initier, par des moyens militaires, 
un dialogue national afin de changer le régime et sécuriser le 
retour des réfugiés rwandais dans des conditions équitables. 
Entre 3.000 et 4.0 00 combattants du FDLR sont déployés à 
travers le Sud-Kivu, où ils créent des poches d'insécurité. Le 
gouvernement Rwandais définit les combattants du FDLR com-
me des forces génocidaires ex-FAR/Interahamwe qui représen-
teraient  une menace pour la population rwandaise, puisqu’ils 
essaient, selon Kigali, de parachever le génocide. En effet, une 
« culture Hutu » de mauvais augure se crée dans le Sud-Kivu, 
puisque l'ethnicité hutue joue un rôle clé dans le discours du 
FDLR, qui dépeint le Rwanda post-génocide comme étant favo-
rable aux tutsis mais inéquitable et incertain pour les hutus. La 
gravité du génocide est minimisée et elle est remplacée par des 
sentiments d’injustice et de victimisation des hutu rwandais par 
leurs « rivaux » ethniques, et en conséquence, les craintes du 
Gouvernement rwandais à propos de la persistance des idéolo-
gies de la haine sont confirmées. Néanmoins, le FDLR est une 
plus grande menace à la population du Sud- Kivu qu'au Rwan-
da. Le FDLR n’occupe pas de terrain  au Rwanda mais contrôle 
des territoires dans le Sud-Kivu. Dans beaucoup des localités 
de la province, la rébellion est très violente et elle a ébranlé le 
caractère social et démographique du Sud-Kivu. L’intensité des 
crimes du FDLR enlève aux rebelles le droit à leur prétendue 
« légitime défense » et va bien au-delà des objectifs affirmés de 
la rébellion. Pendant les longues années d’exil, et en vue de sur-
vivre dans une région instable, le FDLR a perdu la plus grande 
partie de sa motivation idéologique et n’est finalement devenu 
qu’un mouvement fragmenté éparpillé dans l’est du Congo.
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	 1.	 introduCtion
Following the Rwandan genocide in 1994, Rwan-
dan Hutu fled to neighbouring countries at the behest of gen-
ocide leaders and out of fear of retribution from the Tutsi-led 
Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which took charge of Rwanda. 
Approximately 1.2 million Rwandans crossed into Zaïre’s east-
ern provinces of North and South Kivu, where refugee camps 
were set up near the Rwandan border. The Zaïre refugee camps 
thus provided sanctuary to civilians, to the former civilian ad-
ministration, to former Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR)2 and to 
Interahamwe militia members who were jointly responsible for 
the genocide. Between 1994 and 1996, these forces enlisted and 
trained refugees in the camps and were rearming in prepara-
tion for an attack against Rwanda;3 hence, the Rwandan con-
flict was effectively transferred into Zaïre. 
The  Rwandan  government  asserted  that  the  ex-
FAR/Interahamwe and their new partisans sought to complete 
the genocide. It appealed to the international community to re-
solve the problem, otherwise threatening to take matters into 
its own hands. In 1996, a rebellion began against Zaïrian Presi-
dent Mobutu Sese Seko by the Alliance of Democratic Forces 
for the Liberation of Congo-Zaïre (AFDL)4 with support from 
Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. In the ensuing seven-month war, 
Mobutu was toppled and replaced by Laurent Désiré Kabila and 
Zaïre was renamed the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). 
At the onset of the war the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)5 
launched an attack on the refugee camps, aiming to crush the 
remaining elements associated with the genocide. The camps 
were dismantled, some 600.000 refugees were forcibly repatri-
ated to Rwanda and many others dispersed throughout North 
and South Kivu and to neighbouring countries.6 The protracted 
presence of Rwandan refugees in the Kivus shored up a series 
of armed rebellions against the new regime in Kigali, which 
crystallised in the politico-military Democratic Forces for the 
Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR).7
The armed wing of the FDLR currently constitutes 
the largest armed foreign group operating in the DRC. It has an 
estimated overall force of between 8.000 and 10.000 “abacun-
guzi”8 combatants.9 Of these, between 3.000 and 4.000 are de-
ployed in South Kivu, where they contribute to endemic insecu-
rity. This paper attempts to depict the FDLR rebellion in South 
Kivu, in the light of its significance to the Rwandan refugees 
and to the Rwandan conflict, while also considering its ramifi-
cations on the local population. It seeks to assess whether the 
FDLR in South Kivu is capable of challenging the Rwandan re-
2	 Forces Armées Rwandaises.
3	 Human	 Rights	 Watch:	 “Rwanda/Zaïre:	 Rearming	 with	
Impunity.	International	Support	for	the	Perpetrators	of	the	
Rwandan	Genocide,”	HRW Arms Project, Vol. 7, No. 4	(New	York:	
May	1995).










Refugees	in	the	Great	Lakes	region,”	AI Index AFR 47/016/2004 
(London:	2004);	and	Human	Rights	Watch,	“Rwanda:	The	




Nations	Secretariat:	Report of the Investigative Team Charged 
with Investigating Serious Violations of Human Rights and Inter-
national Humanitarian Law in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
S/1998/581	(June	29	1998).







ICG Africa Briefing (Nairobi/Brussels:	December	17	2004),	p.	6.	
FDLR	commanders	also	try	to	inflate	the	movement’s	force	
and	use	a	multitude	of	code	names	in	an	effort	to	give	such	
an	impression. • IOB Discussion Paper 2006-05
gime, if it poses a threat to the Rwandan population, and lastly, 
to investigate the inclination of the rebels to disarm and repat-
riate to Rwanda. 
South Kivu offers the FDLR insurgency a safe ha-
ven from Rwanda. It consists of eight administrative territo-
ries— Shabunda, Kabare, Walungu, Mwenga, Kalehe, Uvira, 
Fizi and Idjwi— with a varied landscape that is replete with 
tropical forests, mountains, highlands and lowlands, and so 
provides safe areas in which guerrilla movements may mobi-
lise and hide. South Kivu is also endowed with gold, cassiterite 
and coltan deposits,10 and agricultural wealth. From the 1990s 
onwards, already deep-seated violence became more acute in 
South Kivu society, much of it carrying ethnic overtones. This, 
together with an absence of central state control, the inacces-
sibility of many parts of the province, and the increased possi-
bility to exploit and profit from its resources, foster many insur-
gencies in South Kivu. Its proximity to Rwanda is a key reason 
for the FDLR insurgency there. The province is highly populated 
and the Hutu rebels place a strain on its agricultural and min-
eral resources, complicating the Rwandan refugees’ relations 
with  host  South  Kivu  communities.  Many  local  civilian  and 
church organisations accuse Rwandans of almost all criminal 
activity in South Kivu and for introducing a violent culture there, 
despite decades-long violence in eastern Congo.
The first part of the paper considers the FDLR’s ori-
gins, and its ideological drive which revolves around professed 
Hutu grievances against the RPF-led regime and the aim of re-
storing Hutu privileges in Rwanda. The second part attempts to 
sketch the rebellion. It briefly looks at the rebels’ recruitment 
patterns, their deployment in South Kivu, their organisation 
and military capabilities and it highlights their conduct. The 
final section considers the potential repatriation of Rwandan 
Hutu combatants and their families to Rwanda and the roles 
that might be played by the Congolese government, the inter-
national community and the Rwandan government to support 
it. This paper is mainly based on research carried out in South 
Kivu over a number of brief visits in July and August 2005. Be-
tween July 27 and August 8 and between August 23 and 25 2005, 
I conducted interviews in Bukavu, and then travelled to the ter-
ritories of Kabare, Walungu and Mwenga for further research. 
Between August 10 and 14 and between August 20 and 22 2005, 
I conducted research in Uvira and along the Ruzizi Plain. Inter-
views, for the most part, were conducted with FDLR combat-
ants, civilian and military personnel of the UN Mission to the 
DRC (MONUC), Congolese government officials, commanders 
of the newly-integrated Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC), civil 
10	 South	Kivu’s	mineral	wealth	has	been	a	key	factor	for	ex-
ternal	intervention	in	the	DRC.	See,	for	example,	UN	Security	
Council:	Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Ex-
ploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2002/1146	(October	16	2002);	
and	UN	Security	Council:	Final Report of the Panel of Experts on 
the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of 
Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2003/1027	(Oc-
tober	23	2003).IOB Discussion Paper 2006-05 • 
society representatives and, to a lesser extent, with Congolese 
civilians and Rwandan civilian refugees. Although conducted in 
mid-2005, the research remains relevant, as FDLR combatants 
stay on in South Kivu; they continue to be a cause of insecurity 
in the province and a thorn in Rwando-Congolese relations. The 
persistence of the FDLR rebellion signifies, on one hand, that 
the Rwandan conflict remains unresolved; that Rwandan rec-
onciliation is hampered and that hate ideologies remain alive 
in the Great Lakes region. On the other hand, it indicates that 
the FDLR has become entrenched in the local reality of disorder 
and violence, and that it has partly lost its initial ideological un-
derpinning and has become a “Congolese” movement.
	 2.	 origins	And	ideology
The FDLR descended from the Rwandan Liberation 
Army (ALiR)11 and it is correspondingly regarded as the offspring 
of the genocidal forces. After the dismantlement of the refugee 
camps, the former Governor of Kigali, Colonel Tharcisse Renza-
ho, and ex-FAR Lieutenant Colonel Paul Rwarakabije12 created 
the ALiR. The ALiR was composed of ex-FAR— both génocid-
aires and non-génocidaires— and Interahamwe, but also young 
new recruits from the refugee population. The ALiR was a reac-
tionary organisation, aiming to overthrow the new regime in Ki-
gali through cross-border raids from the Congo, and to reinstall 
Hutu control in Rwanda. In 1997, the ALiR infiltrated northwest-
ern Rwanda, where it led an insurgency against the new regime. 
It killed Tutsi genocide survivors and Hutu who were seen as 
RPF  collaborators,  destroyed  infrastructure,  and  tried  to  in-
terrupt foreign aid to the Rwandan regime.13 Thus, the ALiR’s 
actions gave weight to the Rwandan government’s assertion 
that the rebels sought to continue the genocide. By mid-1998, 
the RPA crushed the uprising,14 killing and capturing key ALiR 
commanders and combatants, and the ALiR was subsequently 
restructured into two separate branches in the Congo, with 
help from President Kabila who broke his earlier ties with the 
Rwandan government. ALiR I was based in Masisi (North Kivu) 
and Shabunda (South Kivu), and ALiR II was based in Kinshasa 
and fought with the Congolese Armed Forces (FAC)15 against 
the Rwandan and Ugandan-backed rebels in a second war that 
began in 1998 and officially ended in 2002. In 2000, ALiR I and 
ALiR II came together under the politico-military structure of 
the FDLR and Paul Rwarakabije became Commander-in-Chief 
of the movement.16
11	 Armée de Libération du Rwanda.
12	 Renzaho	is	accused	of	Category	1	genocide	crimes	and	is	
currently	detained	in	Arusha	for	his	leading	role	in	the	geno-
cide.	Rwarakabije	is	not	on	the	List of Category 1 Genocide Sus-
pects	issued	by	the	Rwandan	government,	though	he	may	be	
responsible	for	crimes	committed	in	Rwanda	in	1997-1998	(see	
infra).	African	Rights:	Rwanda: The Insurgency in the Northwest 
(London:	September	24	1998),	p.	11;	and	International	Crisis	
Group:	“Disarmament	in	the	Congo:	Jump-starting	DDRRR	
[see	glossary]	to	prevent	further	war,	”ICG Africa Report No. 38 
(Nairobi/Brussels:	December	14	2001),	p.	7
.
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FDLR combatants are habitually referred to by Ki-
gali as the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and ALiR but the movement’s 
political wing rejects these negative designations, advocating 
instead the opening of an inclusive inter-Rwandan dialogue 
and the safe return of all refugees to Rwanda. The FDLR’s main 
political objective is allegedly to change the regime in Rwanda, 
though not to take over the country as the ALiR had aspired 
to. The FDLR military forces proclaim themselves protectors 
of Rwandan refugees and declare that they will use force to 
achieve the political objectives of the movement.17 
Combatants emphasise that they were denied ref-
ugee status when the camps were closed, and assert that they 
were forced to fight for their rightful return to Rwanda. FDLR 
narratives downplay the genocide, they underscore the death 
of Hutu by the RPF during the civil war and the alleged shooting 
down of President Habyarimana’s airplane by the RPF, and they 
refer to a so-called “double genocide”— a discourse that claims 
that the RPF committed genocide against Hutu in Rwanda in 
1994 and against Hutu refugees in the Congo between 1996 and 
1997. FDLR combatants stress the plight of the Hutu and they 
define the RPF as the “first enemy”, but they maintain that they 
will defend themselves against anyone who attacks them.18 The 
RPF is identified with the Tutsi population and some combat-
ants boast that they have killed or will kill “the Tutsi enemy.”19 A 
young combatant in Burhinyi acerbically remarked, “My father 
may well have killed Tutsi in Rwanda. The Tutsi killed my father in the 
Congo. Now it is my turn to kill Tutsi.”20 
The Rwandan insurgents were marginalised from 
the centres of power and spent long years in the Congolese for-
est. There, they had the social space to organise the rebellion 
and to develop an ideological challenge to the RPF-led regime 
revolving around ethnic injustice. Rebel leaders mobilise Rwan-
dan refugees to take up arms in a “quest for justice”21— to seek 
rectification for the socio-political marginalisation of Rwandan 
Hutu and for the ill-treatment of refugees at the hands of the 
RPA. The RPF and the Tutsi population are entwined in the 
combatants’ and refugees’ minds. This possibly arises from the 
perceived alignment of Tutsi with the RPF before the genocide 
that led to the denomination of all Tutsi as ibyitso,22 signifying 
the persistence of ethnic hatred. FDLR ideology stems from a 
hardening of the Hutu identity in South Kivu, due to a sense 
of victimisation that was fed by myths of oppression and was 
cultivated through life in exile.23 Many Rwandan Hutu refugees 
perceive their hardships in terms of Tutsi (i.e. RPF) malice and 
any traces of guilt pertaining to crimes they may have commit-
ted during the genocide are replaced by feelings of injustice, 
17		FDLR:	Communiqué portant mesures sur les organes des FDLR 
(Washington:	September	12	2003).	Also	see	Rafti,	M.:	“The	
Rwandan	Political	Opposition	in	Exile:	a	valid	interlocutor	vis-
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ile: violence, memory and national cosmology among Hutu refugees 
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which in turn give way to a radical view of their ethnic “rivals.”24 
The hardening of ethnic identities sustains the differentiation 
between Hutu and Tutsi, setting them apart as rivals, and con-
sequently undermines chances for inter-Rwandese reconcilia-
tion. 
FDLR combatants are faced with a grave legacy, 
which incriminates them with being génocidaires or the children 
thereof, who possess a “genocidal ideology.” Though the FDLR 
tried to do away with the negative undertones associated with 
the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and ALiR, and proclaimed to favour 
power-sharing in Rwanda, there is continuity in the Hutu re-
bellions’ and the rebels’ (ethnic) ideology. The Rwandan gov-
ernment employs the designation of the combatants as the 
ex-FAR/Interahamwe and ALiR to indicate that the genocidal 
ideologues are still at large in the Great Lakes region, and that 
the Hutu rebels are unrepentant and might still provoke geno-
cide.25  Consequently,  repatriated  refugees  and  former  FDLR 
combatants must take part in ingando “civic education” camps 
that are organised by the Rwandan National Unity and Rec-
onciliation Commission (NURC) to surrender this ideology.26 
Indeed the rebels were raised in adverse conditions in refugee 
camps and in the Congolese bush under the sway of extremists, 
who instilled anti-RPF sentiments in them. Nevertheless, the 
criminalisation of the Hutu rebels has broader overtones on 
the Hutu population, which is arbitrarily condemned for pos-
sessing a genocidal ideology. RPF treatment of Rwandan Hutu 
refugees as génocidaires by virtue of their being Hutu outside 
their country of origin, and the denial of crimes perpetrated 
against the refugees in eastern Congo by the RPF only deepen 
mutual antagonisms, and widen the “Hutu-Tutsi” schism. The 
Rwandan government’s fear of the continuation of a hate ide-
ology that threatens the security of the Tutsi minority is vali-
dated in South Kivu, but it is also employed by the government 
to justify internal security actions and incursions into eastern 
DRC by the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) to purportedly deal 
with Hutu extremists. 
The claim of Rwandan Hutu “refugee warriors” to 
fight for their rights corresponds to the RPF’s discourse in 1990 
when it invaded Rwanda. The RPF claimed to be fighting for the 
right of Tutsi refugees to return to Rwanda and the FDLR simi-
larly upholds the right of Hutu refugees to return. The Rwan-
dan refugee issue remains unresolved and it lies at the heart of 
the protracted Rwandan conflict. Ethnic resentments and the 





















ble	of	the	Congo	Conflict,”	ICG Africa Report No. 56	(Nairobi/
Brussels:	January	24	2003),	p.	8.
26		Ingando	are	“solidarity	camps”	that	aim	to	eradicate	“di-
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3.	 	 A	sKetCh	of	the	fdlr	rebellion
	 	 in	south	Kivu
 3.1    Military recruitment, positions, organisation  
      and capacity
The  FDLR  emerged  from  the  Rwandan  refugee 
community. Commanders sustained a recruitment network over 
the years and they recruit among young refugees. Total com-
batants currently number between 3.000 and 4.000 in South 
Kivu27, down from an estimated 7.000-15.000 troops in 2003.28  
It is palpable from the youthful appearance of the greater part 
of the troops that the combatants were young children during 
the genocide. Following FDLR ethnic ideology, recruitment is 
confined to Hutu. FDLR commanders also enlist young Rwan-
dan Hutu from Rwanda and Burundi, as rebels incessantly in-
filtrate the borders, entering the Nyungwe and Kibira forests 
and then the Rukoko forest. During the first part of 2005, over 
1.000 new recruits set out from Rwanda and joined the ranks of 
the FDLR.29 Such recruitment currently continues.30 The FARDC 
regularly close their eyes to rebels penetrating the borders.31 In 
order to effectively disrupt the FDLR recruitment network, the 
FARDC must rigorously patrol the Ruzizi Plain, which requires 
labour and logistics unavailable to them.32
FDLR troops are deployed throughout South Kivu 
and they are profuse in remote areas that are difficult to reach 
by  land.  Infrastructure  is  substandard  in  much  of  the  prov-
ince— there are few roads, bridges are dilapidated — and so 
it is difficult to deploy heavy vehicles to quash the insurrection. 
In Shabunda and Fizi in particular, the FDLR have been known 
to join forces with the indigenous Maï Maï militias33  (now in-
tegrated in the FARDC) and with other groups sympathetic to 
their cause, such as the Burundian Hutu National Liberation 
Forces (FNL)34 rebels, who permit FDLR troops to traverse their 
territory.35 FDLR South Kivu Division headquarters are found 
in Ntondo (Walungu territory),36 under the command of Colo-
nel Bertin Amani, also known as “Pilote”. The main FDLR con-
centrations are found in Mwenga, Kabare and Walungu in the 
north, while they are also profuse in the Ruzizi Plain and the 
High Plateaux in the southeast.37 
The FDLR’s military organisation is unlike that of 
typical rebel forces; it is structured like a conventional army,38 
betraying the groundwork of the ex-FAR. The ex-FAR handed 
down to the FDLR an ordered, bureaucratic structure and with 
a High Command that assigns different tasks to combatants 






































CNDD-FDD	(Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-





gade	 headquarters	 were	 found	 in	 Ngandu	 (Fizi	 territory),	
Magembe	 (Fizi	 territory,	 near	 Mwenga	 and	 Shabunda	 ter-
ritories),	 Shabunda	 (Shabunda	 territory)	 and	 Masumbili	
(Mwenga	territory),	there	were	brigades	in	Lubanga	(Uvira	
territory)	 under	 the	 command	 of	 Lieutenant	 Colonel	 Fred	
Ikakiza	and	in	Kilembwe	(Fizi	territory),	which	was	composed	
of	combatants	who	fled	the	Kamina	military	base	in	2002	(see	
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charge of personnel; G2, intelligence; G3, operations; G4, lo-
gistics; and G5, civil affairs. There is strong vertical control and 
commanding officers exercise a high degree of discipline and 
control over much of the FDLR rank-and-file.39 
According  to  MONUC  sources,  FDLR  troops  are 
well trained and skilled in guerrilla warfare.40 FDLR command-
ers have military training camps in the rebel-held villages and 
regularly train new recruits. The FDLR is fairly well armed and 
equipped, but has been enfeebled by ammunition shortages.41 
The former Rwandan army carried with it a sizeable arms cache 
during its exodus from Rwanda to Zaïre in 1994, a large part of 
which was passed down to the new generation of Hutu fighters. 
Until late 2002, the FDLR also received weapons and cash pay-
ments from Laurent Désiré Kabila and Joseph Kabila, who suc-
ceeded his father as President in 2001, for the Hutu combatants’ 
service in the second Congo war.42 In September 2002, Rwanda 
and the DRC signed the Pretoria Accords, which called for the 
withdrawal of all Rwandan troops from the DRC and Rwanda 
ostensibly pulled out its troops.43 Pressured to disarm and re-
patriate Hutu rebels operating in Congolese territory, Kabila 
banned FDLR leadership from the DRC and cut off all support 
hitherto given to the rebels. Nevertheless, Rwanda accused 
Kabila of continuing to support the FDLR.44 Indeed, depending 
on local military circumstances and in the absence of a staunch 
national army, the Congolese government struck alliances with 
and armed the FDLR again to fight Rwanda and its local proxy, 
the RCD-Goma, and break Rwandan influence in the Kivus.45 
FDLR commanders claim that additional weapons came from 
fighting against Congolese militias and the Rwandan army.46 
Much of the FDLR’s arms cache is hidden in impenetrable jun-
gles, according to local sources and to MONUC.47 FDLR com-
manders possess good means of communication48 which are 
crucial elements in controlling the FDLR troops that are spread 
out over large areas in South Kivu. 
 3.2    Conduct in South Kivu
 3.2.1   Combatants’ livelihoods and relations with 
     civilians
In the southern territories of Uvira and Fizi, Hutu 
combatants  are  embedded  with  the  civilian  population  and 
they cultivate plots of land. They are mixed with Rwandan refu-
gees, some are married to local women, have been integrated 
in the local communities, and intermittently take up arms for 
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(UNHCR) and of certain NGOs describe the Rwandan refugees 
as  “hostage”  to  the  rebels,49  compelled  to  remain  outside 
Rwanda, but refugees in Sange claim that the FDLR protects 
them and indicate that refugees are represented within the 
movement.50 Much of the Ruzizi Plain is dominated by Rwan-
dan Hutu, with villages like Kiringye and Katogota referred to 
as “FDLR villages.”51 In the northern territories of Walungu and 
Kabare combatants live in military camps in isolation from lo-
cal civilians and Rwandan refugees are permitted to visit their 
combatant relatives there.52 
The FDLR claim that they have a symbiotic rela-
tionship with the host population and they cite, in support of 
this, the fact that they were “taken in” by the Congolese after 
the refugee camps were destroyed by the RPA.53 When Joseph 
Kabila suspended his support of the FDLR in 2002, the rebels’ 
resources were significantly restricted and cash transfers dis-
rupted. The FDLR benefited only sporadically from subventions 
from governments that were hostile to the Rwandan govern-
ment, such as the Central African Republic and Congo-Braz-
zaville, and contributions from the Rwandan diaspora.54 Rebel 
combatants subsequently began to seek alternative means of 
subsistence. Some FDLR combatants settled in local commu-
nities in South Kivu and cultivated fields, but others began to 
resort to predatory and criminal activities. 
FDLR seize land, occupy houses belonging to lo-
cals, and they steal harvest, livestock, clothes, medicine from 
health centres and plunder private property. As a result, locals 
have lost many means of subsistence, resulting in high levels 
malnourishment.55 Combatants set up roadblocks for “taxing” 
civilians for passage and access to markets. They raise addi-
tional funds through rents on local elites for armed protection, 
through   extraction of minerals, particularly in Mwenga, Luh-
winja, Burhinyi and Kamituga,56 and from “levies” imposed on 
local miners.57 In the Ruzizi Plain, armed FDLR combatants are 
in plain view at the local markets,58 where they sell agricultural 
produce and their loot,59 and where to all appearances they as-
sociate genially with FARDC officers.60
 3.2.2   Violent treatment of civilians
In many parts of South Kivu, the Rwandan Hutu 
rebellion is very violent and the combatants hold sway over the 
population.  FDLR  combatants  allegedly  distribute  letters  to 
local chiefs demanding that they identify “noncompliant” civil-
ians, and to local civic organisations that speak out against the 
FDLR threatening them with reprisals.61 Killings, rape62 and ab-
49	Interview	with	UNHCR	repatriation	officer,	Bukavu,	July	
2005.
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brigade	 commander,	 Lieutenant	 Colonel	 Modeste	 Kitunja,	
Uvira,	August	2005.
61		The	civil	society	organisation	Héritiers de la Justice	possesses	
a	number	of	menacing	letters	written	by	FDLR	political	com-
missioner	Aimable	Gasasira.	Interview	with	representative	of	
Héritiers de la Justice,	Bukavu,	July	2005.
62		The	Centre Olame	and	Panzi	hospital	of	Bukavu	frequently	
treat	women	who	are	raped	by	Rwandan	rebels.	Interview	
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duction for ransom are widespread,63 though they are not prac-
ticed exclusively by FDLR rebels. Women withstand the worst 
of the violence, owing in part to the prevalent practice of sexual 
violence by the rebels. HIV/AIDS is rampant.64 
In the latter part of 2005, violent attacks against 
civilians increased in the northern territories of South Kivu. On 
May 23 2005, 19 Congolese civilians were hacked and beaten to 
death with machetes and hammers in the locality of Nindja in 
Kabare. Other civilians were impaled, women were raped and 50 
were abducted.65 On July 9 2005, in the locality of Ntulumamba, 
also in Kabare, 39 civilians were burned alive and many others 
were maimed.66 Crimes of such enormity are allegedly perpe-
trated by Rwandan Hutu and are largely attributed to a group 
known as the Rasta. 
The Rasta are only found in territories of South 
Kivu. They have hideouts in and around Walungu and Kabare, 
mainly hiding in the Kahuzi Biega Park, from where they make 
nocturnal raids against the populations of surrounding villag-
es, plundering property and raping, maiming, disembowelling 
and incinerating people.67 The Rasta emerged in a context in 
which warlords and armed groups of varied characters and ob-
jectives68 proliferated in eastern Congo under conditions of im-
punity. They were initially formed by “Commander Koffi,” who 
had deserted from the FDLR ranks in Walungu, but their current 
leadership is unknown.69 Renegade FDLR rebels form the nu-
cleus of the Rasta and the bulk of the movement is composed 
of criminal elements from the local communities, ex-Maï Maï 
who were not integrated into FARDC ranks, ex-Maï Maï from 
General Padiri’s faction, ex-Mudundu 40 (M40) elements,70 and 
FARDC deserters.71 These bands of violent youths appear to op-
erate outside FDLR central command, possessing no ideologi-
cal, ethnic or political objectives, fixed only on self-enrichment. 
The Rasta have a good information network with local collabo-
rators in many villages in which they operate who indicate po-
tential targets.72
The FDLR claims that the Rasta are the sole cul-
prits of atrocities committed by Rwandan Hutu in South Kivu.73 
It maintains that Kigali infiltrated the Rasta and that they are 
consequently rivals.74  The FDLR has tried to dissociate itself 
from the Rasta and FDLR commanders offered their service to 
MONUC to jointly dismantle the Rasta but MONUC declined 
the proposal.75 The FDLR allegedly clashed with the Rasta at 
Lokago, near Nindja, chasing them out of the Mugaba forest in 
May 2005,76 but the Rasta reappeared in Nindja to perpetrate 
the aforementioned carnage in the same month. South Kivu-
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loots and kidnaps as a means to raise funds for the Hutu rebels. 
Civilians from Nindja claim that they recognise FDLR combat-
ants  attacking  with  the  Rasta  against  the  local  population. 
They assert that several FDLR combatants change their names 
and “disguise as Rasta,” to commit atrocities.77  According to an 
anonymous source, the Rasta are supplied with ammunition 
from the FDLR,78 but, though the two groups are linked, there 
is no substantial evidence that the Rasta form part of the FDLR. 
The two are presumably separate groups.
Another  prevalent  belief  among  Congolese  civil 
society and church organisations is that the hand of Kigali lies 
behind Rasta operations. They claim that the Rasta are pre-
dominantly Rwandese Hutu returnees, who were repatriated 
under  MONUC’s  disarmament,  demobilisation,  repatriation, 
rehabilitation  and  reintegration  (DDRRR)  programme79  and 
participated in ingando.80 The Rwandan government allegedly 
then uses the Rasta to infiltrate the FDLR to collect information 
pertaining to the Hutu rebellion, to exploit mineral reserves and 
to simulate FDLR crimes.81 However,  these beliefs echo FDLR 
contentions and they remain unsubstantiated.
Local  defence  forces  in  South  Kivu  are  indigent, 
poorly armed82 and are no match for the FDLR rebels. They are 
unable to protect their population and many people flee their 
homes and seek refuge in areas where security is perceived to 
be higher. Scores of civilians from Walungu,83 Kabare, Shabun-
da and Mwenga flee towards urban centres in their territories 
or  further  south.  The  towns  of  Walungu,  Bukavu  and  Uvira 
in particular are engorged with internally-displaced persons 
(IDPs). The precise number of IDPs in South Kivu is unknown 
because people shift from one location to another depending 
on the perceived imminent security situation. This complicates 
the  allocation  of  humanitarian  assistance  to  the  displaced. 
On many occasions, IDPs are attacked by the FDLR and other 
armed groups, who try to steal the food and other provisions 
delivered to the dispersed. Aid delivery to IDPs in need is on 
occasion interrupted due to the volatile security situation in 
northern parts of the province,84 while many displaced persons 
present in towns are entirely cut off from humanitarian assist-
ance.85 
In other parts of South Kivu, civilians express re-
gret harbouring Rwandan refugees after the closure of the refu-
gee camps but claim that they are forced to cohabit with the 
FDLR in order to avoid displacement.86 In the southern areas of 
the province, namely in Uvira and Fizi, living conditions are now 
more endurable. The host populations and the Rwandan rebels 
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Walungu	territory,	due	to	insecurity	in	the	area.
85		Interview	with	MONUC	official,	Bukavu,	August	2005.
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commanders exercise strict control over their troops and do not 
sanction atrocities.87 
The FDLR is entrenched in the refugee community, 
which offers emotional and material support to the rebellion, 
and FDLR commanders recruit among the refugees. It appears 
that many refugees share the FDLR’s ideology, consternation 
and claims and that the struggle of the FDLR is concomitant 
to the social survival of Hutu in South Kivu. Young Hutu refu-
gees, who have a tentative existence and few life opportunities, 
may join the rebellion in search of a future. The UNHCR consid-
ers the refugees captives of the rebels in South Kivu. However, 
many refugees play an important function in the formation of 
the militia and their support for it is crucial to its survival. 
The FDLR has organised and relatively well-armed 
troops, but its military capacity ebbs and flows, according to 
local  circumstances  and  Congolese  and/or  external  support. 
In their aim to subsist, many FDLR rebels resorted to criminal 
activities, in spite of the discipline imposed by their command-
ing officers. The FDLR allegedly protects refugees and defends 
them  against  attack  but  the  enormity of  FDLR  crimes  goes 
beyond the ideological underpinning of its rebellion. To all ap-
pearances, the rebellion has failed, the combatants have lost 
their alleged “right to self-defence” and many live as parasites 
among the host population. In the absence of forces capable of 
or willing to protect them, Hutu rebels consciously target civil-
ians and frequently use psychological and physical violence to 
achieve popular acquiescence. FDLR commanders claim that 
their troops do not commit atrocities against the Congolese but 
accuse the Rasta for the violence in South Kivu. Certain civic 
organisations concur with the FDLR in saying that the Rasta are 
agents of the Rwandan government, sent to carry out violence 
reminiscent of crimes committed during the Rwandan genocide. 
In this way, they argue, Kigali can point to the link between the 
génocidaires and Rwandan Hutu combatants found in South 
Kivu, and can rationalise its professed fear of a repetition of 
genocide. However, such claims are unfounded and are a result 
of anti-Rwanda sentiments among South Kivu civil society and 
church organisations, which far outweigh anti-FDLR/Hutu sen-
timents.88 On the other hand, it is hard to distinguish between 
the Rasta and the FDLR. Both groups speak Kinyarwanda, to all 
appearances they interact and the Rasta are present and com-
mit atrocities in FDLR-controlled areas. This brings into ques-
tion FDLR rivalry claims: why are the Rasta permitted to dwell 
alongside the FDLR fighters? Although the Rasta indeed elude 
the discipline imposed by FDLR leadership and form a separate 
group, there are links between the two groups. FDLR combat-
87		Interviews	with	MONUC	official,	Uvira,	August	2005;	with	
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ants covertly collaborate with the Rasta and may at times join 
them in their criminal ventures. Though the FDLR leadership 
insists that the Rasta are part of a distinct group, it uses the 
Rasta as a scapegoat for FDLR-committed banditry and atroci-
ties, trying to project a better image of FDLR combatants.89 
The FDLR rebellion in South Kivu contributes to 
social and demographic change in the province. Pillage, extor-
tions and violent attacks against the population cause the dis-
placement, destitution and death of local civilians. The number 
of IDPs found in South Kivu is extremely high, due to violence 
carried out by the FDLR and other rebel and armed bands. The 
combatants’  predatory  practices  deprive  the  locals  of  their 
livelihoods. Food for self-subsistence has fallen, malnutrition is 
common, as the rebels expropriate locals’ land and commonly 
pilfer their harvest and cattle, and combatants infect scores of 
people with HIV/AIDS through sexual violence. Rape victims 
and their families tend to be stigmatised, they are humiliated, 
socially marginalised and women who are impregnated by the 
perpetrators are often forced by their families to remain with 
the rebels or they are discarded by their husbands.90 
The rough treatment of the population by FDLR 
combatants and the Rwandan army’s aggressive behaviour in 
South Kivu negatively affects local perceptions of Rwandans, in 
spite of aggression from native armed groups. Rwandans are 
considered extremely violent and are held responsible for intro-
ducing an excessively violent culture in South Kivu.91 Hostility 
stretches against the refugees, who are considered accomplices 
of the combatants, resulting in their thorny integration, at best, 
with the host populations. Nevertheless, structural violence, 
insecurity and disorder in South Kivu, and the emergence and 
operation of a number of armed groups and bands perpetrating 
criminal and violent acts with impunity have severely changed 
the social fabric of the province. Seen through this prism, the 
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	 4.	 rwAndA:	the	homeComing?	
In  1999,  the  Lusaka  Ceasefire  Agreement  was 
signed by the Congolese government and other parties to the 
ongoing conflict, including Rwanda. The agreement called for 
the withdrawal of all foreign troops, under UN oversight, and 
it  identified  the  ex-FAR/Interahamwe  as  “negative  forces,” 
which had to be disarmed by the Congolese army. The Pretoria 
Accords signed between Rwanda and the DRC in 2002, similarly 
assigned responsibility to the Congolese government to track 
down and disarm the “negative forces,” by then, the FDLR. MO-
NUC’s DDRRR unit began operations in the same year to volun-
tarily disarm and repatriate foreign combatants and their de-
pendents to their countries of origin92 but it has fallen short of 
persuading the bulk of the Rwandan Hutu troops to voluntarily 
disarm and return to Rwanda. The official FDLR line maintains 
that combatants would repatriate en masse if political and se-
curity conditions were met, following an inter-Rwandese dia-
logue. However, as “negative forces,” the FDLR cannot embark 
on political dialogue and the disarmament of its troops is han-
dled entirely as a security issue. 
Despite  the  official  line  regarding  voluntary  dis-
armament and repatriation, the FDLR leadership states that 
individual combatants have the option of seeking repatriation. 
It refutes charges of obstructing voluntary DDRRR efforts,93 
but there is much evidence to the contrary. A number of FDLR 
combatants in South Kivu claimed that they were unaware of 
the mechanisms available to them for repatriation.94 In August 
2005, FDLR combatants flocked to a UNHCR camp in Burhinyi 
seeking repatriation.  But as the UNHCR is mandated only to 
deal with bona fide refugees and not foreign combatants who 
fall within MONUC’s mandate, the UNHCR turned the armed 
refugees away and eventually closed the transit site.95 Some 
combatants claimed that they knew of the DDRRR programme 
through MONUC’s Radio Okapi, which broadcasts information 
about DDRRR in local languages, but not from their command-
ing officers.96 MONUC sources claim that FDLR officers shoot 
defectors97 and that combatants are allegedly too afraid to risk 
deserting.98 
FDLR troops claimed that they fear imprisonment 
or death by the RPF in Rwanda and that they are concerned 
about overall discrimination against Hutu there. To support 
their claims they cited the example of returnees who have re-
joined FDLR ranks in South Kivu, allegedly because of inequi-
table conditions in Rwanda, the recent “gacaca refugee” phe-
nomenon99 and contiguous rumours that any Hutu who returns 
92		I.e.	Rwanda,	Burundi	or	Uganda.
93		FDLR:	“The	FDLR	refute	the	assertions	made	by	MONUC	
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to Rwanda is either killed or imprisoned.100 FDLR commanders 
portray Rwanda as insecure to the combatants and tell them 
that  they  will  go  back  “when  the  time  comes.”  Combatants 
claimed that they would return to Rwanda “when [their] head 
orders [them] to go back.”101 They, thus, put their faith in their 
military leaders, but not in their political leaders, who they say 
are unimportant to them.102  
In November 2003, the FDLR rebellion significantly 
weakened when FDLR Commander-in-Chief General Paul Rwar-
akabije and 100 combatants, among them high-ranking FDLR 
officers, defected to Rwanda, following direct negotiations with 
the Rwandan government.103 Rwarakabije affirmed that the re-
bellion had failed to achieve its objectives and that there was 
little choice but to return to Rwanda.104 Hard-line Deputy Com-
mander Colonel Sylvestre Mudacumura105 succeeded Rwaraka-
bije as Commander-in-Chief. In spite of a predicted mass FDLR 
repatriation following the General’s desertion, voluntary repa-
triation remained limited.
 4.1    Vowing for peace
 
In early 2005, Congolese President Joseph Kabila 
sought out the FDLR and, using the mediation of the Sant’Egidio 
community,106 agreed to begin negotiations to repatriate Hutu 
combatants to Rwanda. A series of meetings that began in 
Rome and Kinshasa culminated in Rome on March 31 2005 with 
a pledge by FDLR President Ignace Murwanashyaka that the 
FDLR would end hostilities and transform itself into a political 
organisation.107 The “Rome Declaration” called for the estab-
lishment of an international follow-up committee (Comité de 
Suivi) which would monitor repatriation, and of a steering com-
mittee (Comité de Pilotage) composed of FDLR elements and 
Congolese governmental delegates, who would conduct the 
disarmament and repatriation operations. Kigali pronounced 
that it would receive the combatants and reintegrate them into 
Rwandan society but bluntly rejected discussions with the FDLR 
leadership.108 The Rwandan government made it plain that, in 
its opinion, Kinshasa should be responsible for dismantling the 
FDLR and that the “FDLR issue” was a Congolese affair.109 The 
implementation of the declaration was due to take effect in May 
2005, but the FDLR leadership held up the process allegedly be-
cause the Comité de Suivi was not yet established to guarantee 
the security and fair treatment of the combatants and their 
dependents once in Rwanda. The Congolese government pro-
posed that a mission of 1.000 FDLR combatants should explore 
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rejected the idea.110 During a meeting with MONUC’s head, Wil-
liam Swing, Murwanashyaka kept up the demand for a distinct 
political space for the FDLR in Rwanda in order to disarm, re-
patriate and to continue to operate as a political party.111 
  4.1.1    Circumventing the hard-line leadership
  In May 2005, Murwanashyaka and FDLR Dep-
uty Force Commander Colonel Kanyandekwe set off, without 
FARDC or MONUC escort, to inform FDLR combatants about 
the declaration made in Rome.112 The delegation confined its 
mission to South Kivu and informed senior commanders, but 
not the majority of troops, about the Rome process.113 Murwa-
nashyaka allegedly made use of his presence in South Kivu to 
campaign for his re-election as FDLR President in the forthcom-
ing elections. He failed to report to MONUC on the mission’s 
progress vis-à-vis communication of the Rome process and dec-
laration.114 The FDLR founding members and High Command, 
who have the right to vote for the political bureau, swayed 
Murwanashyaka, who would otherwise lose their vote, against 
the repatriation process. He then cut short his trip and did not 
reach North Kivu. As a result, Murwanashyaka and hard-line 
FDLR commanders soon fell out with the Congolese govern-
ment and MONUC.115
  Kinshasa decided to circumvent the hard-line 
FDLR leadership and made overtures to Deputy South Kivu Di-
vision Commander, Colonel Séraphin Bizimungu, also known as 
Jeribaal Amani or Mahoro Amani.116 On June 24 2005, Mahoro 
Amani disassociated himself from the hard-liners of the move-
ment and proclaimed himself the new Commander of the FDLR 
forces. Amani proclaimed that he “relieved Mupenzi Mudacumura 
of his duties” and announced the creation of the Military Com-
mand for Change (CMC).117 Notwithstanding the fact that this 
moderate faction was in favour of pursuing a political opening 
in Rwanda, it set no political conditions for the repatriation of 
the combatants. Instead, the mutineers prioritised repatriation 
under conditions of assured security, demands for the return of 
the properties of combatants and their dependents, and the 
right not to participate in ingando.118
  Following  the  example  set  by  the  CMC,  an 
Emergency  Directors  Committee  (CDU)119  was  formed  by  a 
splinter group of the Europe-based FDLR political wing led by 
Emmanuel  Hakizimana  and  Lieutenant  Colonel  Christophe 
Hakizabera.120 In a joint press conference in Bukavu on August 6 
2005, the CMC and CDU pledged that FDLR combatants under 
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in three months if the aforementioned conditions were met121 
and proposed a Comité de Pilotage122 whose mission would be to 
establish the conditions to be set by the CMC and to inform the 
combatants about the objective to return to Rwanda123. The dis-
sident faction claimed that ambassadors of the International 
Committee to Support the Transition (CIAT)124 found in Kinsha-
sa and Kigali would unofficially form the international Comité de 
Suivi, though progress in that area was, in fact, slow.125
  The CMC demanded that it be able to guard its 
own troops who would be demobilised, as a precaution against 
attack.126 The CMC also asked for reparations to the combat-
ants for “genocide-related trauma” as a further incentive to 
disarm and repatriate.127 On October 24 2005, from a transit 
site in Luvungi, 24 FDLR combatants under the command of 
Colonel Amani disarmed and returned to Rwanda with their 
dependents.128 Shortly afterwards, on  November 1, the UN Se-
curity Council denounced hard-line FDLR Commander General 
Sylvestre Mudacumura and President Ignace Murwanashyaka 
as warlords, issued a travel ban against them and froze their 
assets.129 
 4.1.2   Resilience of the hard-line command in South  
      Kivu
The split in the FDLR leadership was followed by 
a movement further south by the mutineers in July 2005 to-
wards the Ruzizi Plain. Colonel Mahoro Amani and his troops 
retreated from Birhale to Uvira territory, after an attack by 
forces loyal to South Kivu Division Commander Colonel Ber-
tin Amani and Commander-in-Chief General Mudacumura. A 
battalion under the authority of Mahoro Amani loyalist Major 
Noriega withdrew from Walungu to Luvungi, carrying a large-
sized arms cache.130 Mahoro Amani commands very few troops 
in the field—combatants, in fact, compare Mahoro Amani to 
Commander General Paul Rwarakabije and refer to both as iby-
itso131— whereas Colonel Bertin Amani maintained control over 
the bulk of the South Kivu Division forces and refuses to disarm 
until the Rwandan government considers the FDLR’s political 
demands.132 
  Mudacumura loyalists tried to counter Mahoro 
Amani’s repatriation attempts by intensifying the recruitment 
campaign in the Ruzizi Plain. Ex-FAR Lieutenant John began 
conscripting into FDLR ranks “gacaca refugees” found in Burun-
di133 and newly-enlisted combatants were intercepted in August 
by the FARDC 108th Brigade in the territory of Uvira.134 The new 
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and contended that if they were to join FDLR ranks they would 
benefit from an eventual mass repatriation. Four of the new re-
cruits are ex-FAR soldiers who lived in refugee camps in eastern 
Zaïre until 1996 when the camps were closed and they returned 
to Rwanda where they were imprisoned until recently. All pris-
oners maintained that they were former FDLR members.135 
		 4.2  Resisting forcible disarmament
The idea of forcibly disarming the FDLR was coined 
on a number of occasions, even though previous attempts by 
the Congolese government had unfavourable results. In No-
vember 2002, the FAC attacked a demobilised FDLR brigade at 
a military base in Kamina that was monitored by MONUC. It 
allegedly killed the brigade commander and 437 combatants, 
after which the surviving combatants took back their arms, fled 
and linked up with FDLR troops in North and South Kivu.136 The 
FDLR leadership subsequently declared its mistrust of the in-
ternational community and of the DDRRR process.137 Following 
a string of events in 2004,138 which yet again triggered Rwandan 
threats to invade the DRC to crush the FDLR in November of the 
same year,139 forcible disarmament was considered once more. 
In January 2005, the African Union resolved to create a force 
to forcibly disarm and repatriate the FDLR,140 and the newly-in-
tegrated Congolese army began a series of offensives against 
the FDLR in the northern territories of South Kivu to force Hutu 
rebel disarmament, with support from the MONUC South Kivu 
Brigade.141 
  The aim of the FARDC operations against the 
FDLR was to physically and psychologically press the FDLR to 
disarm.142 Operations intensified when the FDLR backed down 
on its commitments made in Rome. FDLR camps and supplies 
were destroyed143 and the combatants were pushed away from 
their resources. The Hutu rebels suffered few casualties,144 as 
many combatants fled, avoiding confrontation with the Congo-
lese army. In their escape path, FDLR combatants slaughtered 
many civilians. The FDLR re-infiltrated certain bases after the 
withdrawal of the FARDC and MONUC and rotated throughout 
South Kivu, changing FDLR concentrations in the province.145 
In the aftermath of operations against them, the FDLR staged 
violent retaliatory attacks against civilian populations and in-
tensified pillaging and extortions, while in many areas vacated 
by the FDLR, FARDC troops harassed the population and plun-
dered mineral resources.146 FDLR commanders made it plain 
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able  in  combat.  However,  combatants  among  rank-and-file 
FDLR threatened to “kill even infants” in the case of onslaught 
by the Congolese army.147
The potential repatriation of FDLR combatants and 
their dependents is shrouded in uncertainty. FDLR command-
ers prevaricate; they underscore the downside of repatriation 
and tell their troops that the time has not yet come to return to 
Rwanda, in order to hamper voluntary repatriation. Many com-
batants genuinely appear to believe that they might be killed 
or imprisoned if they return to Rwanda without international 
oversight. Hutu who have fled the country over the preceding 
months worsened their fears. FDLR commanders possibly in-
struct ex-combatants returning to South Kivu from Rwanda to 
join the FDLR rebellion and to maintain that they are ex-FDLR, 
as a ruse to demonstrate that the Rwandan regime mistreats 
demobilised  FDLR  combatants.  Many  combatants  and  their 
families are, therefore, unconvinced that it is safe for them to re-
turn to Rwanda and they see no incentive to do so. The majority 
of the FDLR troops, including many commanding officers, live 
in poor conditions in South Kivu. Though they would have ac-
cess to basic services in Rwanda that are unavailable to them in 
South Kivu, such as health facilities and schooling for their chil-
dren, they opt for the familiar albeit adverse living conditions 
of the Congolese bush. At the same time, it appears that more 
than a few FDLR combatants wish to demobilise and return to 
Rwanda but they are either unaware of the mechanisms avail-
able to them for repatriation or are held back by their leaders. 
FDLR hard-line leaders psychologically and physically obstruct 
voluntary DDRRR measures in order to sustain the strength of 
their forces and hence the rebellion in South Kivu.  
  Despite  ostensibly  banning  FDLR  leadership 
from the DRC, FDLR leaders travelled openly in the DRC and 
Joseph Kabila attempted to gain international recognition for 
the FDLR by commencing negotiations with the Hutu rebels un-
der the mediation of the Sant’Egidio religious community. Yet 
the FDLR leaders did not abide by their pledge made in Rome 
to disarm and return to Rwanda, they neglected the pertinent 
information campaign targeting their combatants, fell out with 
Kabila and brought about infighting and further divisions be-
tween moderate and hard-line leaders of the movement. To all 
appearances, the FDLR leadership set out to negotiate the repa-
triation of its troops to Rwanda merely to play for time, as FDLR 
leaders were aware that they were militarily weak compared to 
the RDF, they were apprehensive of international threats to dis-
arm them and possibly hoped that political and military condi-
tions might eventually change in their favour. On one hand, the 
147		Interviews	with	FDLR	commander	and	FDLR	combatants,	
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hard-line leaders who played a key role during the genocide 
were unlikely to genuinely favour voluntary repatriation, in fear 
of facing justice. On the other, although political leaders are in-
significant to the troops and President Murwanashyaka is no 
more than a nominal head, political exigencies indicated that 
they bet on political recognition by the international commu-
nity, which would allow them to claim prominent positions in 
Rwanda.148 Nevertheless, the FDLR lacks the credible bargain-
ing power that could permit the movement to transform itself 
into a political party in Rwanda. The combatants’ demeanour 
in South Kivu denies the FDLR any legitimacy and the Rwandan 
government rejects negotiating with it due to its link to the gen-
ocidal forces. FDLR combatants are however able to repatriate 
individually to Rwanda, where they would be “re-educated” in 
ingando in order to be integrated back into society either as ci-
vilians or as soldiers of the RDF. 
The moderate CMC FDLR faction revealed more 
than a tactical interest to seem cooperative and appeared to 
have the combatants’ needs at heart. Kabila tried to sideline 
FDLR hard-liners by designating Amani as interlocutor but the 
mutineers fell short of winning over the greater part of the FDLR 
forces. Notwithstanding the pressure on the FDLR hard-liners 
exerted by UN sanctions against their military and political 
heads, it will be difficult to remove the grip of hard-line com-
manders over their troops. Former FDLR Commander General 
Rwarakabije’s incapacity to take with him to Rwanda the bulk 
of his troops in 2003, and Colonel Amani’s inability to mobilise 
the remaining troops to do so in 2005, indicate that the hard-
liners of the High Command effectively control their forces. 
Despite  joint  FARDC-MONUC  operations,  the 
Rwandan rebels proved very resilient against attack. Well-ac-
quainted with the terrain of South Kivu and adeptly trained in 
guerrilla tactics, FDLR troops swiftly recoiled. In all likelihood, 
local informants warned FDLR combatants about imminent op-
erations. The FARDC aimed to fight the FDLR through a war of 
attrition but civilians paid the price of the operations— the com-
batants became more aggressive as they lost their resources, 
while they used the local population as a human shield against 
further attack. In fact, civilians found themselves trapped be-
tween two forces: the FARDC and the FDLR, both committing 
crimes against them. 
The FDLR continues to infiltrate Rwanda and is a 
potential threat to the Rwandan population, but it represents a 
greater danger to Congolese civilians. The FDLR was consider-
ably weakened over the years, as a result of casualties, frag-
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ammunition. It proved unable to overpower the Rwandan army 
and it lingers in the DRC, where it disrupts Congolese lives. The 
FDLR is indeed predominantly a Congolese concern, it is part of 
the local experience, and the Congolese army has the obliga-
tion to dismantle it. The disarmament and repatriation of the 
FDLR has been tackled as a security issue, lacking a political 
dimension.  Consequently,  the  Rwandan  internal  situation  is 
not taken into account, and certain fundamental reasons for 
the troops’ presence in South Kivu— the sincere fear of many 
combatants of conditions in Rwanda, and the unwieldy state of 
inter-Rwandese reconciliation— are not addressed. The Rwan-
dan government lacks consistency in its approach towards the 
FDLR, as at times it exaggerates the threat represented by the 
FDLR to Rwanda and declares that the Rwandan army will dis-
band the rebels, and at other times, it maintains that it is a Con-
golese obligation to do so. The resolution of the FDLR problem, 
however, necessitates Rwandan input. The Rwandan govern-
ment discusses with individuals in the FDLR, as indicated by 
the negotiated return of former FDLR Commander Rwarakabije 
in 2003, but not officially with the FDLR as a group. It thus en-
sures that it can keep the rebellion in check, without giving the 
advantage to FDLR leaders claiming legitimacy. Paul Rwaraka-
bije and Mahoro Amani demonstrated that repatriation might 
take place through the defection of groups splintering off from 
core forces. The Rwandan government should make plain to 
FDLR combatants and their families that domestic conditions 
are conducive to voluntary repatriation, in order to encourage 
those wishing to leave the Congo to return, and should allow 
some international oversight of the process, in order to reas-
sure the combatants, if it truly wishes the rebellion to die out.IOB Discussion Paper 2006-05 • 2
	 5.	 ConClusion
 
The FDLR rebellion is the most recent in a series of 
rebellions that aimed to attack the RPF-led regime in Rwanda 
from bases in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The FDLR re-
bellion was able to take form in South Kivu because of the dis-
orderly situation in the peripheral Congolese province, which 
eludes the authority of the central government. South Kivu’s 
topography shields the rebels from the Rwandan army and oth-
er hostile forces. There, officers of the former Rwandan army 
were able to arm and orderly train a rebel group akin, in fact, to 
a conventionally-structured armed force. The FDLR High Com-
mand exercises vertical control over the troops that are spread 
out in South Kivu, through the close watch of commanding of-
ficers. 
FDLR hard-line leaders formed the mental frame-
work of the rebellion by sketching a solemn picture of post-1994 
Rwanda for the Hutu population. The refugees’ personal ex-
periences during the destruction of the refugee camps in 1996 
confirmed the image of an ethnically-skewed Rwanda. Ethnic-
ity, hence, acquired a central function in the FDLR ideology, as 
it impinged on the combatants’ faith in the purpose of their 
insurgency. Combatants were indoctrinated against the RPF 
and commanders brought into play the need for Hutu to remain 
united in order to survive. They were brought to believe that 
Hutu are at risk in Rwanda and that through the rebellion they 
would have the power to change the iniquitous situation there. 
The FDLR’s political aspirations are purportedly to initiate a 
national dialogue in order to change the Kigali regime and to 
secure the return of Rwandan refugees under fair and safe con-
ditions. Violence is, for now, the combatants’ bargaining tool to 
achieve these objectives.
  Kigali considers FDLR combatants as ex-FAR 
and Interahamwe genocidal forces. It portrays them as géno-
cidaires  who  represent  a  threat  to  the  Rwandan  population 
because they allegedly aspire to complete the genocide. Dur-
ing the closure of the refugee camps, many Interahamwe and 
ex-FAR were killed, others were repatriated to Rwanda, while 
still others were killed or captured during rebel incursions in 
Rwanda by Rwandan army counterinsurgency operations. This 
suggests that few indeed may still be among the FDLR. Many 
FDLR commanders are ex-FAR, but most combatants are young 
Hutu who were raised in refugee camps and in the South Kivu 
bush. They may have participated in the genocidal bloodshed 
but as child perpetrators, themselves victims of the violence. 
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broader refugee community, which is also suspected of compris-
ing génocidaires, as it remains outside Rwanda. The contention 
that Rwandan Hutu in South Kivu possess a “genocidal ideol-
ogy” appears to act as a self-fulfilling prophecy; a foreboding 
“Hutu culture” in the making. 
FDLR combatants have internalised the rhetoric 
of Hutu grievance, which revolves around Hutu victimisation 
and assumptions of oppression by the Tutsi. The RPF is identi-
fied with the Tutsi, the pre-genocide “enemy.” The genocide is 
played down, combatants pay little heed to genocide survivors 
and history is adjusted to highlight Hutu mistreatment: Tutsi 
monopolise socio-political life in Rwanda (which harks back to the 
Bahutu Manifesto); the RPF began a long war by invading Rwanda 
in 1990 and caused the death and displacement of many Hutu; the 
RPF shot down President Habyarimana’s airplane; the Rwandan Pa-
triotic Army killed Hutu in Congo/Zaïre. Genocide-related guilt is 
consequently ebbing and feelings of injustice and victimisation 
replace it. Combatants claim that the Hutu were denied refu-
gee status and the right to freely return to Rwanda and so were 
forced to take up arms— a discourse that the RPF upheld in 
1990. The FDLR rebellion should, therefore, be seen in the cir-
cumference of the unresolved Rwandan conflict, which is again 
summed-up in ethnic terms and remains linked with the refu-
gee question.
Many Rwandan refugees in South Kivu emotion-
ally and tangibly support the FDLR rebellion. Rwandan women 
are married to and have children with combatants, whom they 
raise with the FDLR “liberation” dogma; refugees are the vec-
tors of FDLR ideology, and the rebels originate from the refugee 
community. Young Hutu who live in an insecure environment in 
the DRC, lacking education opportunities and future life chanc-
es, are more secure within the rebel forces than as civilian refu-
gees and possibly join the FDLR in the hope they might come 
across such opportunities. The refugees are not passive, but 
many play an active role in sustaining the insurgency in South 
Kivu.
  The  FDLR  leadership  stands  in  the  way  of 
voluntary  disarmament  and  repatriation  to  Rwanda,  largely 
through  physical  and  psychological  intimidation.  Command-
ers inform their troops and refugees that conditions in Rwanda 
continue to be inauspicious for their return, in order to sustain 
FDLR troops in South Kivu. Combatants and their families are 
afraid of what they will find and how they will be treated in 
Rwanda, and new waves of Hutu refugees— the “gacaca refu-
gees”— add weight to their disinclination to return. Though 
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cal communities and might not wish to leave South Kivu, many 
others are war-weary; they lead precarious lives in South Kivu 
and wish to go back to Rwanda. However, they are obstructed 
by FDLR commanders, who suppress dissidence— deserters 
are shot and prospective absconders are afraid to risk desert-
ing— and many combatants are not informed about the mech-
anisms through which they could return to Rwanda. Voluntary 
repatriation is, therefore, flawed. On the other hand, forcible 
disarmament of the Hutu rebels is extremely complicated, as 
proven by violent backlashes against the civilian population 
and by the FDLR’s resilience against FARDC operations. FARDC 
soldiers are inadequately trained, not fully unified, poorly paid 
and they are not motivated to risk fighting the FDLR in difficult 
terrain that is mastered by the rebels. Many FARDC soldiers 
choose to loot and terrorise their own population, while to all 
accounts Maï Maï elements of the FARDC, who in the past com-
monly struck alliances with the FDLR, continue to support the 
rebels. Maï Maï permit the FDLR to go on with the recruitment 
of new conscripts, who penetrate the Ruzizi Plain and the High 
Plateaux along the Rwandan and Burundian borders. The Con-
golese government itself supported the FDLR until recently and 
has never prevented the flow of arms to the rebels. The inca-
pacity and unwillingness of the Congolese government to dis-
mantle the FDLR have, in fact, been key factors in the rebels’ 
protracted presence in South Kivu.  
  FDLR  combatants  have  flagrantly  abused 
South Kivutians. They and other armed elements have scarred 
the social psyche and have changed the demographic construc-
tion of South Kivu, through years of plunder, massacres and 
sexual violence, which have caused population displacement, 
malnutrition and the spread of disease. Many violent acts in 
South Kivu are attributed to the notorious Rasta, who commit 
crimes in the vein of the brutality perpetrated during the Rwan-
dan genocide. Though the FDLR and the Rasta are separate 
groups, it is difficult to distinguish between the two and the 
Rasta are regarded by MONUC, the FARDC and many locals 
as the most radical FDLR band. The FDLR often uses the Rasta 
as a scapegoat for its combatants’ own criminal activities and 
FDLR leaders refute crimes attributed to their troops because 
they seek recognition and legitimacy for the movement. How-
ever, rebel combatants linger in South Kivu and contribute to a 
climate of terror and the population is alone, without local or 
national forces to protect it. 
The Rwandan government claims that the FDLR is 
a Congolese affair but at the same time, it justifies incursions 
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anti-Tutsi hate ideology and so needs to dismantle it. The FDLR 
indeed poses a threat to Rwanda insofar as it could take the 
lives  of  Rwandan  civilians  and  could  damage  infrastructure 
through its incursions across the border. However, its fighting 
capacity has significantly waned because of loss of allies and 
ensuing logistical problems, death, defection and low morale, 
and it cannot now topple the Kigali regime. Yet, its muscle is 
contingent on local military circumstances and it fluctuates, 
at times strengthened by alignments with Congolese armed 
elements.  The  FDLR  is  aware  that  the  struggle  against  the 
Rwandan army is currently uneven and it is no longer waging 
war on Rwanda. FDLR leaders tried to thwart Congolese and 
international threats to forcibly disarm their troops, by vowing 
to abandon arms and go back to Rwanda. FDLR President Ig-
nace Murwanashyaka, who is a puppet in the hands of the High 
Command and no more than a figurehead to the rebels, set off 
to negotiate the rebels’ repatriation in Kinshasa and Rome in 
early 2005, but attached untenable political conditions to the 
FDLR’s pledge to end the rebellion. The Rwandan government 
is not under imminent threat by the FDLR and refuses to dis-
cuss with the leaders it considers responsible for the 1994 geno-
cide. Similarly, the international community widely accepts the 
Rwandan position regarding the FDLR and does not pressure 
Kigali to negotiate with the FDLR heads. 
The “Rome Declaration” came to a standstill, as it 
transpired that FDLR hard-liners, many of whom are apprehen-
sive of facing justice in Rwanda, control the greater part of the 
rebel forces. The moderate faction led by Deputy South Kivu 
Division  Commander  Colonel  Mahoro  Amani  and  supported 
by Kinshasa, which splintered from the central command with 
the aim of fulfilling the peace pronouncement made in Rome 
in June 2005, failed to sway the FDLR troops to return in se-
curity to Rwanda. Die-hard commanders maintained authority 
over their troops and, to all appearances, Amani will only be 
able to persuade a fraction of FDLR troops to repatriate. Amani 
loyalists will most likely return and reintegrate into the RDF, in 
the same way as former FDLR Commander General Paul Rwar-
akabije and the officers who followed him to Rwanda did. Kigali 
negotiated the return of Paul Rwarakabije in 2003 and it could 
similarly negotiate that of Mahoro Amani and other moderate 
factions wishing to break away from the central control of the 
movement. It needs to offer credible security guarantees and 
tangible reassurances to the refugees and combatants. It could 
make use of FDLR factionalism, engaging in dialogue with the 
moderates, if it genuinely wishes to effectively finish off the 
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Unlike the RPF in 1990, the FDLR does not occupy 
land in Rwanda and cannot overpower the Rwandan Defence 
Forces. Instead, it dominates land in South Kivu and harasses 
the local population. The scale of violence exercised by FDLR 
combatants in South Kivu transcends the stated ideological 
motivation of the Hutu rebellion. Though much of the FDLR’s 
criminal activity is a means of subsistence for the combatants in 
the absence of regular payment, it is also the outcome of adap-
tation to a broader Congolese experience. Patterns of violence 
have become embedded in eastern Congo and, encouraged by 
impunity for violent acts, predatory groups emerged without a 
genuine political agenda for waging war but whose raison d’être 
is often sheer criminality aiming at enrichment. The FDLR has, 
to a significant degree, integrated into this local context, be-
coming in many ways a “Congolese” phenomenon, and many 
combatants only sporadically join FDLR bands for the spoils. In 
Rwanda, combatants could not engage in banditry on this scale, 
and so this potentially acts as a further disincentive to return. 
The FDLR has no credibility in claiming to protect its troops and 
Rwandan refugees against attack, because the rebels assault 
civilians and not the Rwandan army or other hostile armed 
groups. Over the long years in exile, the FDLR has been marred 
by factionalism, logistical problems and the struggle to survive 
in precarious circumstances. In their attempt to survive, many 
combatants became integrated in local communities and oth-
ers remained in the forest. Ultimately the movement lost sight 
of its ideological goal of waging a “liberation war” and became 
fragmented, so that now its combatants have lapsed into a 
predatory or sedentary existence in the DRC.
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Annex	1:	glossAry
AFDL     Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
      Congo-Zaïre
ALiR      Rwandan Liberation Army 
CIAT      International Committee to Support the
      Transition 
CNDD-FDD National Council for the Defence of Democracy- 
      Defence Forces of Democracy
DDRRR   Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation,
      Rehabilitation and Reintegration
DRC      Democratic Republic of Congo
FAR      Rwandan Armed Forces 
FARDC    Armed Forces of the DRC
FDLR     Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda
FDLR CDU  FDLR Emergency Directors Committee 
FDLR CMC  FDLR Military Command for Change
FNL      National Liberation Forces 
M40      Mudundu 40
MONUC  UN Mission to the DRC
NURC     Rwandan National Unity and Reconciliation
      Commission
RCD-Goma  Congolese Rally for Democracy-Goma
RDF      Rwandan Defence Forces 
RPA      Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF      Rwandan Patriotic Front
UNHCR   UN High Commissioner for Refugees